Logics of general branching time, or historical necessity, have long been studied but important axiomatization questions remain open. Here the difficulties of finding axioms for such logics are considered and ideas for solving some of the main open problems are presented. A new, more expressive logical account is also given to support Peirce's prohibition on truth values being attached to the contingent future.
Introduction
The logic of historical necessity, the most natural combination of tense with the modality of necessity/possibility, has a long and venerable history of development, especially in connection with arguments of human freedom versus determinism. Variations include the important logic CTL* of discrete branching time. Such branching time logics and their close relatives, have recent applications in reasoning about and by robots or other agents [28, 1] , in combinations with epistemic logics [14] , in the software engineering of reactive systems [8, 24] , and in philosophy [20] .
Despite this effort and interest, technical difficulties have left the presentation of a sound and complete axiom system for the main logic of historical necessity as an open problem. Similar technical difficulties with CTL* have only just been solved in [23] . Let us see what the difficulties are. We start by concentrating on the general logics of branching time and return to CTL* briefly later.
Peirce versus Ockham
Consider (reincarnated) Aristotle now musing over the truth of the following:
(1) it is necessary that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow; (2) it is possible that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow; and (3) there will be a sea-battle tomorrow.
If one believes in human freedom or some other kind of indeterminism then there may be differences in the truth values of Aristotle's statements. Even if one believes in a world determined by Newtonian mechanics or that a god knows now everything that will happen then there may be sense in reasoning about different truth values in terms of current human knowledge.
Suppose that the truth of the third statement is as yet undecided. So the first statement is false, the second is true and the third presents a problem for any account of the truth values of such statements.
Prior's Ockhamist logic of historical necessity
In this section we define the most widely accepted logic of historical necessity, Prior's Ockhamist branching time logic (OBTL).
A tree (frame) is a pair´Ì µ where Ì is a non-empty set, is a binary relation on Ì such that:
(1) is irreflexive and transitive; (2) is linear towards the past, i.e. if Ý Ü and Þ Ü then either Ý Þ , Þ Ý or Ý Þ; (3)´Ì µ is connected, i.e. for all Ü Ý ¾ Ì , there is Þ ¾ Ì with Þ Ü and Þ Ý.
A tree frame represents the structure of time: the necessity of history is guaranteed by the linearity of the past.
A branch of´Ì µ is a maximal linearly -ordered subset of´Ì µ. A branch captures one possible evolution of history from the beginning to the end of time.
Computer scientists in particular, should note that we are making no assumptions about the discreteness of time: so a point on a branch may not have a successor, but instead may have points on that branch arbitrarily soon in the future. Any linear order could be a branch of some tree frame. Even if´Ì µ has a discrete branch then it is possible that it is not of order type .
Fix a countable set Ä of atoms. Structures Ì ´Ì µ will have a tree frame´Ì µ and a valuation for the atoms, i.e. for each atom Ô ¾ Ä , ´Ôµ Ì . Having Ø ¾ ´Ôµ is supposed to represent the atom Ô being true at the time Ø.
The language Ä´ À £µ is generated by the connectives , À and £ along with classical and . That is, we define the set of formulas recursively to contain the atoms and for formulas « and ¬ we include «, « ¬, «, À « and £«.
Formulas are evaluated at points on branches in structures. We write Ì Ü « when « is true at the point Ü of the branch of the structure Ì . This is defined recursively as follows. Suppose that we have defined the truth of formulas « and ¬ at all points of all branches of Ì .
Then for all branches , for all points Ü of :
Ì Ü £« iff for every branch containing Ü we have Ì Ü «.
As well as the usual abbreviations , , , and°, we have « «, È « À « and ¦« £ «.
It should be clear that and È are Prior's usual linear-time connectives operating forward and backwards along a branch of time. The connective £ quantifies over all branches containing the point of evaluation. This logic cannot express (even loosely) metric modalities such as Aristotle's 'tomorrow' but we can still use it to make interesting statements about possibility and time. For example, consider the statement 'if it is necessary that I will eventually stop talking and possible that it will always rain then it is possible that there will be a time when I stop talking and it is raining'. This might be expressed viá
We refer to and À as mirror images. Definitions, results and proofs are said to have mirror images when we can swap and À (and reverse ). Of course, this is not always possible in the unsymmetric branching time logic.
We say that « is valid in OBTL iff for all structures Ì , for all branches in Ì , for all points Ü ¾ , we have Ì Ü «.
Peircean logics
We can define Prior's Peircean temporal logic by restricting the Ockhamist language to allow as Peircean formulas only atoms and formulas built recursively from other Peircean formulas « and ¬ in the form «, « ¬, £ «, £ « , ¦ «, ¦ « and the mirror images. This language is clearly less expressive than the Ockhamist language: by design Ockhamist statements about the contingent future, such as Ô , have no Peircean equivalent.
However, I would argue that Prior's Peircean logic is probably far too restricted in its expressiveness if the only purpose of the restriction is to conform to Peirce's prohibition of contingent statements. Clearly, any Ockhamist formula of the form £« has a truth value dependent only on the point of evaluation and not on the branch of evaluation and so should have been acceptable to Peirce. We might call such formulas Ockhamist state formulas following the terminology of some computer science branching time logics. (Note that a different suggestion along the same lines was made in [25] ¬µ max´ ´«µ ´¬µµ, ´£«µ ½ ¾ · ´«µ, ´ «µ ½ ¾ · ´«µ and ´À « µ ½ ¾ · ´«µ. The depth is always a whole number because of the restricted syntax.
If an Ockhamist formula « is a state formula, i.e. a Boolean combination of formulas of the form £¬ then it is straightforward to prove that, as we mentioned above, its truth value depends only on the point of evaluation and not on the branch. In that case we write Ì Ø « iff for every (or equivalently any) branch through Ì containing Ø we have Ì Ø «.
To help with the proof we need to confine ourselves to a finite set of atoms. So we suppose that all structures and all formulas are defined with respect to the finite set Ä of atoms.
We will introduce a bisimulation game played by two players on a pair of Ä-structures Ì ½ Ì ½ ½ ½ µ and Ì ½ Ì ½ ½ ½ µ.
In describing the game and some of its properties we will say that Ø ½ and Ø ½ agree on a set of formulas iff for each « in the set we have Ì ½ Ø ½ « iff Ì ½ Ø ½ «. Suppose that first makes a £ È move in which he chooses ½ . will use her strategy to choose some branch ½ containing Ø ½ in Ì ½ . As Ì ½ Ø ½ £ ¬ , Ì ½ ½ Ø ½ ¬ and there is some × ½ Ø ½ from ½ such that Ì ½ ½ × ½ ¬. Because ¬ is a PBTL formula this means Ì ½ × ½ ¬. Suppose that chooses × ½ . Now will use her strategy to choose some × ½ Ø ½ on
From here onwards 's strategy is also a strategy to last at least rounds in the game oń´Ì
By our induction hypothesis it must be the case that × ½ and × ½ agree on all PBTL formulas of depth at most .
Thus we have our contradiction as they disagree on ¬.´µ Suppose´Ì ½ Ø ½ µ and´Ì ½ Ø ½ µ agree on all PBTL formulas of depth at most · ½ .
We describe the strategy for to last · ½ rounds.
Consider the first move of : a £ Èmove or a £ À move. The case of a £ Èmove. 
In all three cases, if chooses Ý then Ý and Ý agree on all formulas of depth . By the inductive hypothesis has a strategy to last rounds in the game on´´Ì ½ Ý ½ µ ´Ì ½ Ý ½ µµ.
This strategy can be used to allow to continue to last a further rounds in the game oń´Ì
The case of a £ À move is similar.
LEMMA 4.2
For each Ã ¾ AE , there is a pair of structures (and nodes)´´Ì ½ Ø ½ µ ´Ì ½ Ø ½ µµ which agree on all PBTL formulas of depth Ã but disagree on ¦ Ô.
PROOF. In the proof we deal with ordinals up to and including . Our structures will be in the language with a single atom Ô. Recall that we wish to show that can last Ö rounds in the game on´´Ì Ù µ ´Ë Ú µµ for all Ö-pairs´Ù Úµ.
The case of Ö ¼ is clear.
Assume can last Ö rounds in the game on´´Ì Ù ¼ µ ´Ë Ú ¼ µµ for all Ö-pairs´Ù ¼ Ú ¼ µ. Assume that´Ù Úµ is an´Ö · ½ µ -pair. We show how can play so that at the end of the first round the marked nodes form an Ö-pair. The inductive hypothesis can then be used to provide with a strategy to keep playing for another Ö rounds.
Say that the last entry in Ù is Ü Ò and that in Ú is Ü Ñ where Ü ¾ and Ò Ñ . To describe 's strategy we need consider 's first move: one of four types.
Consider a £ Èmove in which chooses a branch in Ì containing Ù. The branch may be the special branch ½ or it may be any one of the other branches which end in´ Ð µ for some Ð . In the latter case can choose almost any branch through Ú with the same Ö-low index segment as as we now describe.
There are several cases depending on whether the last entry in Ù is after, within or before the´Ö · ½ µ -low index segment in . We also should consider some special cases when the length of Ù is less than Ö · ½ . For now assume Ù Ö · ½ . First assume there is no´Ö · ½ µ -low index segment in , i.e. there is Ð Ö · ½ such that ends with Ð . All the entries in and so in Ù will have indices Ö · ½ . Now as the last entry in Ú matches the last entry in Ù up to index Ö · ½ so it too will have an index Ñ Ö · ½ . If has an after the end of Ù then we also want an in after the end of Ú, etc. Thus we define a short finite sequence Ú ¼ to place after Ú and we will define Ú Ú ¼ ´ Ö·½ µ as the branch for to choose. There are four similar cases for defining Ú ¼ depending on Ü and whether appears in after the end of Ù or not. They are straightforward. Finally assume the last entry in Ù is after the´Ö · ½ µ -low index segment in .
Say that Ù Ù ¼ Ù ¼¼ and Ù Ð where is the´Ö · ½ µ -low index segment of (and Ð Ö · ½ ). Note that the last entry of Ù must be Ð so must the last entry of Ú. We put Ú Ð . There are also the cases when the length of Ù (or Ú) is less than Ö·½. We omit consideration of these here but they are similar.
Given such a and , i.e. ones with the same Ö-low index segment, the matching first Ö elements, and agreement on whether there are s and s after the respective ends of Ù and Ú, it is straightforward to show that can respond to 's choice of a node Ú ¼ in with the other half Ù ¼ of an Ö-pair´Ù ¼ Ú ¼ µ as required. We describe one case as an example.
Consider the case of the last entry in Ù being before the´Ö · ½ µ -low index segment of . So If makes a £ Èmove by choosing a branch from Ë containing Ú then should choose any branch containing Ù from Ì which has the same low index segment as . This is as above.
The case of making a £ À move is similar but simpler.
This completes the induction. Thus, for all Ö Ã we have a strategy for to last Ö rounds in the game on´´Ì Ù µ ´Ë Ú µµ for each Ö-pair´Ù Úµ. As´ Ã·½ µ is a Ã-pair we know that can last Ã rounds in the game on´´Ì µ ´Ë Ã·½ µµ. By the previous lemma´Ì µ and´Ë Ã·½ µ agree on all PBTL formulas of depth Ã.
The result follows by contradiction: if there was a PBTL equivalent to ¦ Ô then it would have a certain depth Ã.
We thus have the following result comparing the expressiveness of the two logics.
THEOREM 4.3 Not every Ockhamist state formula has a Peircean equivalent (over all structures).
This strongly suggests that the logic of Ockhamist state formulas might be a better formalization of Peirce's ideas on historical necessity.
Other branching time logics
There are many closely related logics of branching time in the philosophical, mathematical and computing logic literature. For example, in [31] and [33] we see the more expressive temporal connectives 'until' and 'since' from [16] instead of just Prior's and À.
In the account here we assume that atoms are either true or false at points of time regardless of the branch of evaluation. This assumption, that atoms contain no 'trace of futurity' [21] , is common but arguable on philosophical grounds. For example, one might argue that at the exact moment an agent makes one choice, it is still possible that she, he or it makes an alternative choice: only afterwards is the choice fixed. See [34] for more discussion. Our notrace-of-futurity assumption also means that validity is not closed under substitution and the substitution rule cannot be valid for the logic. For example, Ô £Ô is a validity (and is used as the axiom HN1 below) but Õ £ Õ is not valid. Here we will maintain consistency with the majority of accounts of the logic in making this assumption but note that it is not difficult to define semantics via more general valuations and make corresponding adjustments to the proof theory: simply remove the axiom HN1.
Branching time logics are much used in computer science. With the clock ticks of computation steps, the frames used are often restricted to being discrete structures of height . The main logics here include the early Peircean logics UB of [2] and CTL of [6] as well as the main Ockhamist version CTL* of [8] and an extension PCTL* [29, 18] of this to include past-time operators. There are also logics [5, 17] along these lines incorporating fixed-point operators. The computer science branching time logics are often given semantics on transition structures with a finite number of states but a straightforward unwinding argument [10] shows that this corresponds directly with a tree of possible state-time combinations.
Note that in computing branching time logics a similar result to our theorem above was established in [8] when it was shown that there are CTL* state formulas which have no CTL equivalents. There are many other similarities between CTL* and OBTL including the role of the important notion of limit closure which we meet below. In fact, CTL* can be defined within the 'until' and 'since' branching time extension [33] of OBTL.
Of course, we can also define first-order branching time logics in which we can quantify over individuals who may or may not take part in various relations from time to time. Some exciting new work in finding decidable fragments of such logics, including first order CTL*, is reported in [15] and [27] .
There is a very useful survey of branching time logics in [34] .
Decision procedures
The propositional branching-time logics mentioned are (almost) all decidable. This follows from the decidability of the full monadic second-order theory of the class of all trees as shown in [12] . This result follows from the result in [13] in which it is shown that this decision problem reduces to the decision problem for the first-order theory of binary, bounded, wellfounded trees with additional unary predicates. In [12] automata and a composition method for proving decidability are both used to show that this latter first-order theory is decidable. The complexity of the procedure here is unclear. Interestingly, this decidability proof does not work for the Ockhamist logic without the no-trace-of-futurity assumption on valuations of atoms. Apparently CTL* 'folklore' claims undecidability for the corresponding version of CTL*, i.e. with the truth of an atom at a point being able to also depend on the rest of the fullpath. This result should also extend to the general OBTL logic.
For the discrete, height computer science logics, other decision procedures have been developed based on tree automata or linear automata running along branches. For example CTL* has a decision procedure of double-exponential time complexity [9] .
Axiomatizations
Even though decision procedures exist and so we know that these logics are recursively axiomatizable there are still reasons why an explicit and simple axiomatization might be useful and interesting.
Here is a first attempt. The inference rules are modus ponens and temporal and path generalization: £ .
We define derivability using this system in the usual way. Soundness of the system follows from the usual induction on the length of derivations once we check that the rules are sound and the axioms are valid. These are straightfoward to check. To see that the Gabbay-style rule is sound suppose that´Ô À Ôµ « is valid but that the atom Ô does appear in the formula «. 
Kamp frames and bundling
We will see in the next section that this system is not complete for Prior's Ockhamist branching time logic. However, we can show that the system is complete for variant semantics which are interesting in their own right. These are the logics of Kamp frames (as seen in [26] ) and of bundled tree frames [3] . is an equivalence relation such that:
if Ü Ý then we do not have Ü Ý if Ü Ý and Ù Ü then there is Ú Ý such that Ù Ú.
In this paper we will later find it useful to think of the points in Ã as being arranged in an imperfect two-dimensional grid with increasing vertically and relating some of the points on each horizontal level. Figure 1 portrays a very simple example. As we will see below, when we consider the semantics of Ockhamist tree frames, a time point in a tree corresponds to a whole -class of Kamp points and a branch corresponds to a vertical line of points. Now let us define a Kamp structure by placing a valuation for the atoms on a Kamp frame. First we need to impose extra restrictions on the frames and labellings of points. We need to require that truth of atoms on all points in any -class agree. Say that the structure´Ã µ is a Kamp structure iff´Ã µ is a Kamp frame and for all Ù Ú ¾ Ã, if Ù Ú then for all atoms Ô, Ù ¾ ´Ôµ iff Ú ¾ ´Ôµ.
Truth in Kamp structures is a more traditional modal logic concept as formulas are evaluated at points (rather than at states on paths). We define truth by having the temporal connectives operate vertically (upwards is the future) and £ allow a horizontal move within an -class. To be precise, for all branches , for all points Ù of :
With such a semantics we can define a notion of what might be called Kamp-validity. It is straightforward to check that the axiom system given in the last section is sound for the logic of Kamp frames.
A bundle on a tree frame´Ì µ is a set of branches such that each Ø ¾ Ì is contained in at least one branch. We say that´Ì µ is a bundled tree and we also have bundled structures´Ì µ. We can define bundled tree semantics for the language of Ockhamist logic by restricting evaluations and quantification to branches from a particular bundle. Thus we have bundled notion of truth, written´Ì We say that a bundled frame (or structure) is limit closed iff is the set of all branches. We prefer the limit closed terminology, which is used in computing, because of overuse of the more common term, 'completeness'. Limit closure is appropriate because the set of branches is closed under the limiting operation of finding longer and longer initial sub-branches.
Corresponding to each Kamp-structure is a bundled structure.
LEMMA 8.2
For each Kamp structure´Ã µ there is a bundled structure´Ì µ with:
Furthermore, truth is preserved in the sense that for all « of Ockhamist logic, for all Ù ¾ Ã,
PROOF. That´Ì µ is a bundled structure is clear. To prove the truth preservation is a straightforward induction on the construction of formulas. Figure 2 shows the tree corresponding to the frame in Figure 1 ; the bundle contains all the four maximal branches shown. In particular note that a point in an Ockhamist frame corresponds to the combined notion of a state on a path. This correspondence preserves truth of PCTL* formulas in the obvious way as we have seen.
It is equally straightforward to give a converse translation. 
It is clear we have:
The following are equivalent:
(a) bundled tree validity; (b) Kamp frame validity.
An axiomatic completeness proof for a similar axiom system to ours with respect to the bundled Ockhamist semantics is given in [11] and several alternative axiomatizations are described in [34] . An axiomatization of the bundled logic without using any non-standard rules (such as the IRR-style ones) was given in [31] .
LEMMA 8.5
The axiom system is sound and complete for the logic of bundled tree validity.
We refer the reader to [11] for details of the proof. The idea is basically a Henkin-style construction with much help from the IRR rule. We construct a Kamp frame model of a consistent formula directly from a frame of maximally consistent sets of formulas with a valuation for the atoms defined by whether the atom appears in the set. We can prove a truth lemma showing that the formulas true at a point in the model are exactly those in the set which forms that point. By dealing with only special maximally consistent sets which satisfy an IRR condition we can easily define the Kamp relations and so that the truth lemma follows.
To prove completeness for the bundled logic for an axiom system without an IRR-style rule such as that in [31] , is a more complicated process. Zanardo proceeds in a step-by-step construction building a Kamp frame with points labelled by maximal consistent sets. This labelled frame is called a chronicle following the terminology in [3] for similar sorts of stepby-step constructions in axiomatic completeness proofs. At any stage the chronicle may have defects such as a point with « in its label but having no future point with « in its label.
A step in the construction consists of curing such a defect by adding exactly such a new point. Obviously there are several consistency conditions which need to be kept holding: for example, if a new point Ý is added in the future of an old point Þ and ¬ is in the label of Þ then we require ¬ to be in the label of Ý.
Incompleteness for limit closure
We now show that bundled and Ockhamist validity are distinct notions. It has been argued (see [20] and [19] ) that bundled validity is a more correct formalization of human intuitions about time and possibility. However, the argument is not very convincing and is not widely accepted. In computing there are practical reasons for considering utilizing bundled logics in a few circumstances but a limit closed logic would usually do just as well. So it is important for us to continue to try to axiomatize the limit closed logics.
Note that the example shows that the system is incomplete for validity of (limit closed) Ockhamist branching time logic. Of course, this system is sound for . So it is clear that we need new axioms and/or new rules of inference to allow us to derive the extra validities.
In the axiomatic completeness proofs for the bundled logics described above we construct, one way or another, a Kamp model for the formula and then use the translation defined in Lemma 8.3 to find an equivalent bundled tree structure. In certain cases, such as in any construction of a Kamp (or bundled) model of the negation of our example formula , the specified bundle does not include all the branches of the resulting tree. We could say that some new branches emerge when we factor out by the equivalence relation to form the tree. There are generally an uncountable number of these emergent branches.
In In general, in an axiomatic completeness construction we may have £« in a set which makes a point in a constructed Kamp frame but when we translate to a tree we find that there is an emergent branch which spoils the truth lemma by being a model of «.
The problem of modifying the axiomatic completeness constructions for Kamp structures or bundled trees so that a truth lemma can be proved for the limit closed tree has not been solved. In fact, it is not even clear what extra axioms or rules are likely to be able to be used to ensure that this is possible.
Ideas for limit closure axioms and completeness proofs
There have been several (more or less) recent suggestions for axioms for capturing limit closure in Ockhamist branching time logic.
Burgess presented a useful axiom in [3] along the lines of
There were several seemingly more expressive suggestions in [30] . One,
is similar to our example formula above. This seems yet more expressive again. Unfortunately these axioms do not come with any obvious ways of using them in a completeness proof. One promising new idea for making use of such limit closure axioms comes from [23] in which this sort of rule was used in the completeness proof for an axiom system for the limit closed branching time logic CTL* for computing applications. The axiom £ ´¦« ¦ ´´¦¬µÍ´¦«µµµ ´¦« ¦ ´´¦¬µÍ´¦«µµµ is in the language of CTL* which has until Í and tomorrow operators and a semantics based on discrete trees of height but the limit closure property is analogous.
The CTL* axiom was used in modifying the construction in the step-by-step completeness proof for the bundled version of CTL* so that the resulting Kamp frame can be used to build a limit-closed model of a consistent formula. So the basis of the construction of a model of a consistent formula in CTL* is that for building a bundled model of : we build a Kamp frame step-by-step and label the points with consistent sets of formulas. However, not just any bundled model of will do because of the 'no bad emergent branches' requirement, i.e.
we do not want any emergent branches (called fullpaths in CTL*) (which appear when we convert from Kamp frames to trees) to alter the truths of formulas on the explicitly constructed (i.e. non-emergent) branches.
In the CTL* proof this was accomplished by using a deterministic linear automaton to record the state of construction (along each branch) and an elaborate banning mechanism to ensure that bad fullpaths were not allowed to emerge from the final labelled Kamp frame. In this case the automaton and banning mechanism required that we define a finite closure set of formulas from and only use maximally consistent subsets of this to label the points.
The automaton, which read labels on points along branches, would only accept bad branches and so we required the automaton to not accept any branch. The acceptance criterion (in Rabin style) depends on which states come up infinitely often as it reads a branch. By ensuring a certain uniformity of infinitary behaviour in the states of the automaton the nonacceptance of any branch was able to be extended to the emergent branches as well.
The Rabin acceptance criteria for was determined by a set ´Í ½ Î ½ µ ´Í Ã Î Ã µ of pairs of sets of states. The automaton would accept a branch iff there was some such that some state in Í came up infinitely often as it read the labels along the branch and no state in Î did. To avoid constructing an accepted fullpath the banning mechanism was used to provide an effective finite mechanism for bringing about this infinite property.
The basic idea of banning is as follows. We label each point with a list ´ ½ Ô ½ µ ´ Ò Ô Ò µ of banned label-index pairs. The aim is to not allow any to occur again as the label above the point unless some label in Î Ô occurs first. So, if we see a label in some Í Ô occurring on a branch in the construction but no label in Î Ô has recently occurred (on that branch) then we will want to place´ Ôµ in the banned list. The banned list is inherited by successors with specific changes in certain circumstances.
Much of this proof is specific to the discrete -height semantics of CTL*. However, there may be features which can be incorporated in a completeness proof for the limit closed Ockhamist logic. On the other hand, it may not be at all possible to use these ideas in the more general Ockhamist case. Obviously there is much more work to be done.
